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Abstract
This paper demonstrates the use of network analysis
to identify core nodes associated with ransomware
attacks in cryptocurrency transaction networks. The
method helps trace the cyber entities involved in
cryptocurrency attacks and supports intelligence efforts
to identify and disrupt cryptocurrency networks.
A data corpus is built by the unsupervised machine
learning graph algorithm ‘DeepWalk’ [1]. DeepWalk
evaluates the position of nodes within networks. It
compares the relative position of different nodes
(similarity) and identifies those whose removal would
most affect the network (riskiness). This method helps
identify on the blockchain the key nodes that are
involved in the execution of a ransomware attack.
When applied to the ransomware “cash out” graph,
the method derived “riskiness” scores for specific
nodes.
Analysing the derived “riskiness” at a
community level (groups of nodes in the network)
provides an enhanced granularity for identifying and
targeting influential nodes.
Such insight could
potentially support both intelligence and forensics
investigations.

1. Introduction
In 2019 over US$6.6 million was paid globally to
cryptocurrency addresses related to ransomware,
according to the 2020 Crypto Crime Report from
blockchain analysis company Chainalysis [2]. This is
emphasised by the fact that the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (US SEC) has seen over
1,000 documents submitted by companies between
April 2019 and May 2020 that list ransomware as a
critical risk factor to their businesses [3]. Companies
face multi-million dollar outages such as those faced by
the city of New Orleans in 2019. The city’s Chief
Administrative Officer, Gilbert Montaño, indicated that
the ransomware attack will cost the city at least US$7
million [4]. There are plenty of opportunities for cyber
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criminals to cash out their booty. One of the most
popular ways for ransomware attackers to do so between
2013 and 2016 was through the Russian based BTC-e
exchange [2].
Identifying the magnitude and location of illicit
funds throughout the blockchain is no easy endeavour,
the cryptocurrency investigation companies Elliptic and
Chainalysis provide their own powerful proprietary
software platforms to do this. However, there are some
open-source tools and techniques that allow us to
analyse this evolving threat to confront ransomware
attacks.
Throughout this paper, network and graph will be
used interchangeably as we explore the utility of graph
analysis for cyber financial crime prevention. Out of the
hundreds of thousands of Bitcoin transactions on a
blockchain, the first challenge is to isolate the relevant
Bitcoin nodes used in a ransomware attack. We will
further show how graph analysis reveals patterns and
provides the capability to expose nefarious relationships
between the Bitcoin transactions and addresses in the
ransomware-Bitcoin network. In addition, DeepWalk
[1] embeddings provide a machine-learning technique
for graphs that sets up feature extraction from the
ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network. These features
can be used in a similarity analysis that is based on
Cosine Similarity to identify the risk posed by the
removal of a node from the Bitcoin-ransomware cashout network. We will apply the Cosine Similarity
calculation comparing nodes with the ransomware seed
address to isolate individuals and communities of risky
nodes. Furthermore, our target network dataset can be
enriched with contextual labels derived from other open
source blockchain analysis tools setting up future
research with more advanced machine learning
prediction techniques.
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2. Fighting financial crime with graph
analysis
Tracing illicit flows of money through a network
requires techniques that reveal patterns and provide the
capability to expose nefarious relationships across vast
amounts of data. The trails left behind by these financial
flows provide a web of transactions interconnected by
accounts and services to obfuscate identity on purpose
by blending seamlessly into the economic system. In
traditional banking, the transactions, accounts and
services form a network and can be modelled as a graph.
For example, De Marzi [5], uses credit card fraud as a
case study, modelling where credit card holders make
legitimate transactions at different services and in
another graph showing where fraud actors with stolen
credit card data test the stolen credit card numbers. By
modelling this fraud scenario as a graph, it helps identify
patterns where the credit card data may have been stolen
or where stolen credit card data is being tested at certain
services.
Voutila [6] uses the PaySim mobile money network
financial dataset originally posited by Lopez-Rojas et al
[7]. The graph model created contains transactions,
merchants, clients and client identifiers in order to filter
a large set of activity and perform graph analysis, such
as weakly connected components, to identify fraud rings
within the larger graph. Components, nodes, in a graph
are said to be weakly connected if they are all connected
or reachable from any other node in the same graph.
Galler and Fischer [8], first revealed this algorithm and
it has been used to understand how well connected
networks are, how clusters of activity form and how
well the network remains connected when nodes of
certain authority are eliminated.
Furthermore, the case for revealing money
laundering has an even stronger emphasis today. AntiMoney Laundering laws, regulation and compliance
such as, The Anti-money Laundering and Counterterrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) in Australia [9] and
the 5th Anti-Money Laundering Directive of the
European Union [10] provide a legislative framework
for the prevention and detection of money laundering
and terrorism financing. However, detecting money
laundering networks still proves extremely difficult as
seen in the 2017 royal commission into the Australian
banking, superannuation, and financial services
industry, where over 200 money laundering compliance
failures were revealed with one bank alone [11, 12].
Data and Analytics firm Dun and Bradstreet put this
difficulty down to the scale and complexity of the data
that needs to be analysed to find the nefarious
relationships within the financial transactions. As a firm

they are using graph technology to meet the Anti-Money
Laundering standards previously mentioned [13].
Whilst graph analysis has become an established
tool for identifying and fighting financial fraud in the
traditional economy, a question remains as to the utility
of the method in the emerging space of
cryptocurrencies, especially Bitcoin, which is the
cryptocurrency of choice for most ransomware attacks
today. Bitcoin uses Bitcoin addresses as a banking client
would use their bank account number. Bitcoin value is
sent and received between addresses via transactions.
There are many Bitcoin addresses that make up a
Bitcoin wallet. It is not uncommon for wallet users to
create a new Bitcoin address for every new transaction
to help preserve their anonymity [14]. The full balance
of a Bitcoin address needs to be spent during a
transaction and as such change addresses are often
found, where the balance of the transaction is paid back
to the originating Bitcoin address. Spotting irregular
Bitcoin activity and unusual connections occurring in
the blockchain at scale proves extremely difficult
without the aid of graph visualization tools [14]. These
reveal patterns and anomalies in intuitive and interactive
ways. Therefore, the graphs derived for ransomwareBitcoin behaviour provide a powerful analysis
capability which leverages the Bitcoin ecosystem to
build the scope of the ransomware-Bitcoin target
network.

3. The Ransomware-Bitcoin target network
In line with Clark and Mitchell’s target centric
approach, we begin the intelligence process by defining
a generic target model to guide intelligence collection
and analysis [15]. The generic Target Network Model
(TNM) for our ransomware-Bitcoin target network is
represented by Figure 1.
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Figure 1 – Ransomware - Bitcoin Target Network
Model (‘Cash-out’)
Figure 1 shows the representation of Bitcoin
addresses and transactions at different levels of a target
network in a model of a ransomware campaign. Due to
the size and complexity of the overall ransomware
campaign network the TNM is split between cash-in and
cash-out models. Figure 1 only shows the cash-out side
of the network.
The cash-out network models the proceeds of crime
as they flow from the ransomware seed address that
victims of the ransomware attack have paid into to other
addresses in the Bitcoin universe. These ransom
payments ultimately exit the network where they are
exchanged for other cryptocurrencies or even fiat
currency.
In order to demonstrate the method, we will collect
data related to the cash-out network of the ransomware
campaign, WannaCry 2.0 and populate the generic
target model. This campaign was chosen because the
findings from our network investigation can be
validated against other sources. The next section will

transactions. This ‘on-chain’ data along with the
respective meta-data can be exploited.
Figure 2 shows a data pipeline with associated
analysis techniques that are used to exploit Bitcoin
blockchain data.
Step one – Extract data from the Bitcoin blockchain
- Extract transaction history relating to the
ransom
seed
address
from
the
walletexplorer.com Application Programming
Interface (API).
- For each incoming and outgoing transaction
from the seed address, build the input and
output graphs respectively at ‘D’ levels deep
away from the seed address (see Figure 1).
Step two – Load data into graph database (Neo4j)
- Load extracted input and output graph files
setting input/output addresses as nodes;
transactions as nodes; and Payments as a
relationship between them.
- Post process address nodes to include
corresponding depth ‘D’ of transaction nodes.
Step three – Transform data
- Run the PageRank algorithm and add this as a

Figure 2 - Ransomware-Bitcoin Graph Analysis System
identify the data collection requirements and methods
used and introduce the analysis system being applied to
the populated TNM.

4. Data Collection
The Bitcoin blockchain contains the record of
addresses and transactions involved in Bitcoin

property on the nodes in the network.
Run the DeepWalk algorithm on nodes and
embed the results onto the nodes in the network
Step four – Data analysis preparation
- Run Louvain community detection algorithm
using average in/out degree and PageRank.
Aggregate results of communities.
- Run community detection and return nonaggregated results, returning all nodes in the
-
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network with the respective in/out degree,
PageRank, DeepWalk embeddings, labels,
depth, timestamp. Export to Comma Separated
Values (CSV).
- These network analysis algorithms were run
from within the Neo4j graph database
Step five – Data visualisation
- Import the CSV into python script to:
- Visualise community detection profile
- Python was used to perform Principal
Components Analysis (PCA) + K-means
clustering on DeepWalk embeddings
- Output results to CSV for deep dive analysis
into comparing communities and clusters
across different ransomware by using Cosine
Similarity.
The key transformation of the data we will focus on
in this publication relates to the graph embeddings
derived in steps three and four. The graph embeddings
will become features for future graph machine learning
applications. The PCA undertaken in step five is
essential for managing the dimensionality of the
embedding computations. It is key to the analysis to
examine specific nodes and determine how influential
they are within the Bitcoin-ransomware network. This
would serve as an indicator of their relative importance
in the transfer and circulation of ransom payments. For
this reason, the PageRank algorithm was chosen as an
appropriate centrality measure for this purpose. The
subsequent sections elaborate on the proposed
methodology.

5. Risky node analysis
The blockchain data should yield a network of
wallets and transactions involved in the WannaCry
ransomware attack, but the network data on its own does
not provide sufficient context to identify the key nodes
that are involved in the process. We propose to
approximate the significance of each node in the
network by measuring the effect the node’s removal
would have on the viability and function of the network.
We conceptualise this effect as risk to the network, and
the measurement involved as a measure of riskiness.
Using the DeepWalk graph embeddings that encode the
structure of a graph at each node relative to its position
in the target network (see figure 1), we can leverage
these embeddings as features into a Cosine Similarity
calculation which provides an index of how ‘risky’ the
nodes are relative to the ransomware Bitcoin seed
address. Furthermore, analysing the risky nodes
collectively forms target communities which could
prove more effective as opposed to targeting these nodes
individually.

5.1. Graph embeddings and features
Once the TNM has been created and populated with
the extracted data, the graph itself becomes very large
and dense making it difficult to detect any unusual
behaviour at face value. There needs to be a simplified
way of preserving the graph properties like the structure
and the features on the nodes and edges [16]. This is
achieved by the graph embedding algorithm that
transforms all the information learned from a graph into
a lower dimensional vector space representation. The
graph embedding algorithm chosen for this analysis is
DeepWalk by Perozzi et al [1].
DeepWalk learns structural representations of a
graph’s nodes by capturing its similarity in a
neighbourhood of other nodes and allocating individual
nodes to cliques we call communities [1]. By taking a
graph as an input to the algorithm, latent representations
are produced as an output. These representations
become the input to a neural network. Operating a
neural network on a graph structure allows for deep
feature learning of nodes and edges for a graph [17].
DeepWalk uses deep learning for unsupervised feature
learning, which means, the system learns the node’s
embeddings without any prior knowledge of the graph
topology. Depending on what nodes are encountered
and how often they are traversed during a random walk,
the neural network makes a prediction about a node
feature or classification and embeds that into the node
as metadata. By sampling the graph via random walks,
we build the data corpus for that graph. The data corpus
is then used as the reference library for a node’s purpose
within the graph. For example, in the ransomwareBitcoin TNM the ransomware seed address can be taken
and its “context” predicted within the scope of the entire
graph. This means embedding an understanding of a
node’s features, such as, transaction amount,
connectivity to other nodes (how many input and output
transactions there are from a node) and structural role
(E.g. the root node of the network or a leaf of a weakly
connected branch). Having these embeddings encoded
into a node provides a basis for subsequent
generalisation through various possible means. In this
case, we chose the PCA and K-means clustering
analysis (see figure 2) to reduce the dimensionality of
the embeddings. PCA as a method of reducing large
datasets whilst preserving as much information, or
statistical variability, from the original data [18]. In this
case we were able to reduce the relevant dimensionality
from 128 down to a two-dimensional vector space. This
two-dimensional representation of the graph
embeddings will now be used in the next section as input
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into a similarity analysis to ascertain which nodes in the
TNM are riskier than others.

5.2. Concept of Similarity
Cosine Similarity is a measure used to identify how
similar entities, or in this case nodes in a network, are
irrespective of their magnitude [19]. In this case, the
graph analysed by the DeepWalk algorithm is reduced
to a series of variables which incorporate latent features
of a node’s community structure as an output for use in
calculating the similarity between the vector
representations of these features.
Seeing as the theory of this process has its roots in
natural language processing, we use the analogy of
finding meaning and context (similarity) in a text. The
process allows us to analyse the similarity in words’
meanings, while ignoring the words’ location in the text.
The procedure we are proposing would be equivalent to
having a graph (the document), containing many
random walks (sentences) from each of the nodes
(words) in the graph. Ultimately arriving at a
meaningful similarity of a node’s context with respect
to the other nodes in the graph. An illustration of this
can be seen in figure 3.

5.3. Application
Instead of measuring the distance between two
nodes, Cosine Similarity measures the cosine of the
angle between them. Cosine similarity is superior to a
simple measure of distance in identifying the common
features of disparate nodes. Plotting the distribution of
the cosine similarity, box labelled 5 in figure 3, assert
that there are close similarities between nodes not purely
related to the latent features derived from the DeepWalk
embeddings. By taking the cosine similarity of these
features we are not only considering the proximity of a
node to the ransomware seed address, rather the context
of the node in the whole graph being analysed. This can
be seen in figure 3, box labelled 3, where node C is in
close proximity to the ransomware seed address X,
however in figure 3, box labelled 5, the angle between
C and X is larger than the angle between A and X, where
A is more distant from the ransomware seed address in
box labelled 3.
There could be several reasons for this. The number
of nodes directly connected to nodes C and A, or closely
connected in the neighbourhood (two or three hops
away). Additionally, how many times the particular

Figure 3 - Conceptual view of arriving at a measure of riskiness in the ransomware-Bitcoin graph

node occurs in context to other nodes in the generated
corpus of the entire graph relative to the ransomware
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bitcoin seed address in the network. For example, in the
cash-out graph for WannaCry ransomware Bitcoin seed
address,
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw,
in
figure
4,
a
node,
1BvTQTP5PJVCEz7dCU2YxgMskMxxikSruM, with a
high similarity relative to the ransom seed address
resides at a Bitcoin exchange Poloniex.com. This was
identified as one of the cash-out exchanges used by the
attackers in WannaCry (Bistarelli et al 2018).
Therefore, it follows that similarity scores relative to
the ransom seed address might usefully serve as a proxy
measure for riskiness. The higher the similarity
calculated for a node with respect to the ransom seed
address, the higher the risk score for that node. For
example, if a high-risk scoring node was removed from
the network the attackers would be unable to cash out
their proceeds of crime. Therefore, risk used in this
context refers to the risk imposed on the attacker
fulfilling the objectives of the network.

computationally calculate the similarity of every other
node relative to this node we are able to derive a risk
score. As a result of this analysis a similarity matrix is
produced that can be used as a heatmap to target the
risky nodes in the network. If another node in the
ransomware cash-out network scores a high ‘similarity’
relative to the ransomware seed address, and if that
highly scored node is removed from the network this
node is the next critical to the network fulfilling its
objective of cashing out the ransom collected. This
would allow for the targeting of nodes with the high
similarity scores and hence if we target or neutralise this
node, it puts the network’s objectives “at risk”. For
example, using a classification range the heatmap could
be represented as follows: ‘Very High’ for risk scores
ranging from 0.95 to 1, shaded in red; ‘High’ from 0.75
to 0.95, shaded in Orange-Red; ‘Medium’ from 0.5 to
0.75, Yellow-Orange; ‘Low’ from 0 to 0.5, GreenYellow. Applying this concept to the Wannacry cashout network produces the following results in table 1.

5.4. Similarity as a measure of risk
Similarity can therefore be used as a proxy for
riskiness. Using the mathematical calculation of Cosine
Similarity, a proxy measure for riskiness is established
relative to the ransomware seed address. Taking the
ransomware seed address as the most significant node

Figure 4 - Distribution of node similarity for WannaCry Ransomware seed address
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw cash-out network. Top 20% of nodes by risk score
on a ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network, (because if
there was no seed address created, there would be no
ransom collected), then using the graph embeddings to
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The second most risky node with risk score =
0.9999987018
is
another
Bitcoin
address
1BvTQTP5PJVCEz7dCU2YxgMskMxxikSruM. This
is an address directly linked to the Poloniex.com
exchange where the WannaCry attackers cashed out
their proceeds of crime [20].

Table 1 - Top 20 by risk score for nodes in the
WannaCry
Ransomware
seed
address
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw cashout network.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the risk scores and
the respective node index (address or transaction) for the
WannaCry cash-out graph. In this figure we concentrate
on those nodes with riskiness ranging from 0.95 to 1,
representing the top 20% of nodes by risk score. On the
x-axis, node riskiness is represented by a score from 0
to 1 across the entire network dataset. Where a score
closer to ‘0’ shows little similarity relative to the
ransomware seed address and can be interpreted as a
node in the network that exhibits little risk when it
comes to facilitating the cash-out of ransom collected.
On the other hand, those scores closer to ‘1’, show a
similarity or closeness to the ransomware seed address.
The actual riskiness should be viewed from both the X
& Y measures as it is the cosine of the coordinate point
of one node relative to the ransomware seed address
which is always at position (1,0). Because the analysis
is normalised the radius (or arc in this case) will not
exceed a radius of 1 as it moves from (1,0) to (0,1). This
calculation removes the emphasis on magnitude of the
vectors and measures the angle between two nodes
showing a relative importance to the network no matter
how many levels deep in the network we move away
from the ransomware seed address.
The
ransomware
seed
address,
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw, sits at
position Y=0 and X=1 on the chart and the next closest
node 1LZ9WozeiHEQWE3JQbikGHLXa6qiKLXJjN
represents an address that has a node riskiness of 0.9999
(see table 1) and is therefore deemed critical to the
movement of funds out of the ransomware seed address.

Looking into why these nodes are deemed risky in
the context of this research, we could determine the
Bitcoin
address,
1LZ9WozeiHEQWE3JQbikGHLXa6qiKLXJjN, to be a
false positive in our detection system as it seems to be
part of a bigger cluster of nodes, centred around the
transaction
(ID:
29779df2e2a5a1f823b22e7e974a0082bdfd389edc1c11
d1d4f6b290d8118d27) contributing a small amount of
Bitcoin (0.0034398 BTC) taking place on 31st August
2017 at 16:32:00 UTC. Considering the WannaCry
campaign cashed out on the 3rd August 2017 from the
ransomware seed address [21], this has greatly exceeded
the campaign time window and targeting this particular
node might provide little impact on the risk of the
network fulfilling the objectives. However, some
forensic analysis might be warranted. This address is
one out of 236 other addresses taking part in peeling
activity which ultimately outputs to an address
(1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe)
linked to another exchange, HitBTC.com which could
be targeted for investigation for playing a part in
soliciting illegal ransomware money flows (Neutrino,
2017). As previously mentioned for the next risky node,
1BvTQTP5PJVCEz7dCU2YxgMskMxxikSruM, it has
a direct link to the exchange Poloniex.com. This can be
interpreted as a true positive result from the analysis
system shown in figure 2. Looking at the detail behind
this address, it directly receives 17 BTC, the full amount
of ransom collected from the WannaCry campaign on
the 3rd August 2017 at 10:04:51 UTC. The same time a
twitter bot known as @actual_ransom identified the first
outflows from the WannaCry attackers’ wallets. This
bot was set up by journalist Keith Collins to monitor
activity of the WannaCry ransom addresses [22].

5.5. Risk in communities
To complement the derivation of the risk score is the
identification of additional data that has been extracted
from the walletexplorer API and collected as part of the
analysis system depicted in figure 2. This takes the form
of ‘labels’, ‘PageRank’ and ‘community’. The labels
nominate what service the node belongs to and provide
a strong indicator for the attribution of real world
identification into the Bitcoin ecosystem. In figure 4, we
can see HitBTC and Polinex on two of the highly ranked
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nodes (1BvTQTP5PJVCEz7dCU2YxgMskMxxikSruM
and
1Dha5e1jbTtu4YGALQ3DnfTAk5yxzm4XSR)
indicating these could be cash-out exchanges used by
the attackers. In addition, PageRank is represented by
the size of the bubble in figure 4 and defines node
influence in a network based on the frequency of its
connections to other nodes [23]. That is the larger the
bubble in figure 4, the larger the PageRank and the
larger the influence of the node in the network.

which
is
a
transaction,
29779df2e2a5a1f823b22e7e974a0082bdfd389edc1c11
d1d4f6b290d8118d27 [PageRank=40.4775] occurring
on 31st August 2017 having over 230 inputs with an
output
connected
to
an
address
(1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe)
controlled by exchange HitBTC.com. Despite these
intricate connections these nodes only yield a risk score
of 0.987784659211026 and 0.964703062973474

Figure 5 - Graph representation of the WannaCry Ransomware seed address
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw cash-out network
It is interesting to observe the node position relative
to PageRank and the risk score. The second largest page
ranked
nodes,
1ArG3JwEbF4WrCiEnXQXUAgQumAVzqnQHD
[PageRank=20.493] is used as a change address during
the WannaCry campaign on 4th August 2017 and
subsequently linked to the largest page ranked node

respectively and are positioned well outside the top 20
risky nodes identified in table 1. Therefore, in this
instance, little correlation can be derived between the
risk score and page rank. However, using the
combination of risk score on individual nodes and
community detection it is possible to augment decision
intelligence on what areas of the graph to monitor and
investigate. This is illustrated in Figure 5.
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Community detection is another common fraud
detection technique used on networks to identify
communities of nodes exhibiting anomalous behaviour
that can be targeted for investigation [24]. Attributing a
risk score to these communities on the aggregate we can
determine which communities pose the greatest risk to
the successful fulfilment of the network objectives.
Table 2 demonstrates this.

Table 2 - Median risk score grouped by community
for nodes in the WannaCry Ransomware seed address
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw cashout network
By using the median riskiness for the communities,
it is possible to see how high the middle score is in the
ordered set of risk scores for that community. The
higher that middle score the higher the concentration of
risky nodes to go after. This can be further validated via
the graph visualisation in figure 5. The nodes
highlighted by the red circles indicate the top 20 risky
nodes from table 1 and the groups of nodes encircled by
the shapes highlight the communities of nodes from
table 2.

It can be seen from table 2 and figure 5 that
communities two and three share the highest community
risk scores. Community three contains four of the top 20
risky nodes and visually plays a very central role in the
facilitation of cashing out the proceeds of the WannaCry
ransom. Node number 7 is a transaction within
community
three,
340b44c7a7857e36f81b2e8ba713911ea93e82afde6ea5
590df1a35688845d16, that handles 8.715 BTC of the
collected ransom and routes 6.877 BTC through
community three on 3rd August 2017 and a further
1.8376 BTC splits off into community two. Community
three acts as a mixing community to obfuscate this
portion of the ransom with the transaction at node 18
(131551e35e7a644b76ea5366f744313bff3f959207c41
6f7b7b7f9b1cc90b0a3) combining the ransom cash-out
with four other inputs to produce an output of 32 BTC
on the 4th August 2018 to HitBTC.com owned address
1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe.
A considerable sized transaction heading to an exchange

that would certainly raise suspicion. An interesting
observation on community two is that even though it has
a high community risk score it only contains one of the
top
20
risky
nodes,
a
transaction
1b2a3333f583ae54dba78ccc71f4fe24a22acd0991d364
e75bcf099ce3a84759, ranked 17th in table 1, occurring
on 3rd August 2017 which facilitates 1.8376 BTC of the
cash-out for the WannaCry ransom via one input
address and two output addresses. This is where the
combination of the risk score and community detection
provides further targeted analysis. If we were only to go
on the list of risky nodes in table 1 the investigator could
spend their time looking at community four where 11 of
the nodes reside. However, examining the collective
reveals the median riskiness of that community is only
0.66 (see table 2). Community four is also the largest
community by membership and the relevance of the risk
score dispels the myth that a more populated community
would produce a higher concentration of risky nodes.

5.6. Targeted disruption
Now that there is a way of identifying risky nodes in
the ransomware-Bitcoin network, intervention can be
considered to target these nodes and disrupt or eliminate
them. Looking at figure 6 which is a replication of figure
5 with one of the risky nodes, transaction
131551e35e7a644b76ea5366f744313bff3f959207c416
f7b7b7f9b1cc90b0a3, node 18, removed.

Figure 6 - Graph representation of the WannaCry
Ransomware
seed
address
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12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw
out network, disrupting node 18

cash-

At first glance this looks like a good tactic, severing
the transaction at node 18 will inhibit the ability of the
attackers to continue cashing out their proceeds of
crime. However, the practical implications of doing this
are not so simple. Node 18 represents a transaction with
ID
131551e35e7a644b76ea5366f744313bff3f959207c416
f7b7b7f9b1cc90b0a3, the details of this transaction can
be seen in figure 7. If it were possible to disrupt this
transaction, there would be significant impact to the
attackers fulfilling their objectives. Tracing the amount
from the ransomware seed address, this transaction
receives 5.1309 BTC of the ransom from address
1HQiNjBRrHZpuyaWYXnCMhwcvJPqF5e97M. This
amount is combined with inputs from four other
addresses to send a total of 32.02476446 BTC to address
1ETWkyQUY9nRpVMyGwha4vRhwKgMbomMQe
which belongs to exchange HitBtc.com.

6. Limitations
The concept of the similarity analysis and the
application to a ransomware-Bitcoin cash out network
was only applied to one of the WannaCry 2.0
ransomware
seed
addresses
(12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw). The
analysis system is highly dependent on the quality of
graph embeddings produced by the DeepWalk
algorithm. Whilst preserving the structure of the nodes
of the graph in relation to each other, the embedding
algorithm used in this analysis was still only in
development and not released in the Neo4j (graph
database) production library for graph data science.
Therefore, at this stage, validating the quality of the
embeddings is difficult. In addition, using the output of
the DeepWalk algorithm as input features to the cosine
similarity score, the risk rating or recommendation on
which nodes to attack in the network for intervention in
illicit money flows has a dependency on knowing the
ransomware seed address. Nevertheless, the system can

Figure 7 - Transaction details for transaction ID:

131551e35e7a644b76ea5366f744313bff3f959207c416f7b7b7f9b1cc90b0a3 (screenshot courtesy of
walletexplorer.com)

It would take significant effort, knowledge and real
time action to be able to disrupt this transaction. This
would have to be done in near real time by corrupting
the transaction script by hacking at the Bitcoin software
as was the case when Mt Gox destroyed 2,609 BTC
[25]. Alternatively, fictitious addresses can be
simultaneously generated with their public and private
keys, at the time of the transaction, to receive payments
and sign the Bitcoin over to the next owner in the chain
and divert the ransom funds away from being exchanged
at HitBtc.com [26].

still be used to initiate responses based on the ‘riskiness’
score obtained from the cosine similarity calculation and
auto classify existing and new nodes coming into the
network. To be effective in this manner the operation
would need to be done in near or real-time. For example,
we
see
the
cash-out
activity
for
the
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw
ransomware seed address during the WannaCry
campaign all happen within the space of six hours. The
initial transactions out from the ransomware seed
address,
(409803bb5e124fd028c0482027c7722e84ce55b78204
b279d3a44aba5e7c1698
and
35e5d5fe8c8128cfa6884f56be5817e4138c58c91b79d7
8d3e78a8d365b9d8a7), began at 03/08/2017 04:28:20
UTC.
The
transaction
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(36ef488e59d719fb906254aed61bfe46e8f64778bc6cac
97e56a68c241004c28) that facilitated a cash out at the
exchange Poloniex.com occurred at 03/08/2017
10:04:51 UTC.

7. Future Research
Considering the most targeted pieces of information
revealed from the similarity analysis are the identity of
the address node and its risk score. There remain gaps
in the available identity information from the raw data.
Nonetheless, several features could be used in further
machine learning techniques to predict the nature of
nodes. A prediction algorithm could be built that would
identify, for example, probable exchange services or
other types of categories such as whether a node is
involved in ransomware or not. This would allow
analysts and investigators to estimate the location and
ultimate owner of the address in the Bitcoin network
removing significant barriers to the anonymity afforded
to nefarious actors using cryptocurrencies. This would
be an enormous improvement given the magnitude of
the gap in the raw data. For example, in the data on the
cash-out graph for WannaCry ransom seed address
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw only 3
out of the 280 addresses are labelled with exchange
services (approx. 1%). Table 3 highlights Poloniex.com
and HitBtc.com as the most prominent exchange used
when cashing out the ransomware proceeds.

Table
3
Available
labels
on
12t9YDPgwueZ9NyMgw519p7AA8isjr6SMw
WannaCry ransom seed address

the

Building a prediction engine at scale to assist
attribution of anomalous nodes in the network is outside
the scope of this research paper. However, the data
collected from the analysis system paves the way for
future research in this area. As an example,
cryptocurrency forensic analysis firm Elliptic and
researchers at IBM and Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) have released a public data set of

around 200,000 transactions partially labelled with
illicit or non-illicit flags to identify suspicious
transactions on the blockchain within the context of
Anti-money Laundering (AML) [27].
Understanding a graph in the past helps create a
baseline for what to look for in the future. In order to
understand how a current scenario relates to that
baseline it is important to know what has changed and
what hasn’t. This helps detect any anomalies, or unusual
patterns, within the dynamic nature of a Bitcoin
blockchain graph. More sophisticated algorithms such
as, Microcluster-Based Detector of Anomalies in Edge
Streams (MIDAS), are able to detect dynamic
behaviours in graphs [28]. This lends itself well to the
Bitcoin - blockchain environment as the graphs formed
here are constantly being updated with new addresses
and transactions. In addition, when it comes to
discovering ransomware graphs in such an environment
micro cluster detection helps detect sudden bursts of
activity on nodes or edges, which are common to the
behaviours of both the cash in and cash out graphs in
ransomware / Bitcoin activity [29].

8. Conclusion
This research paper draws insights into using
machine learning techniques combined with human
interpretation to identify nefarious nodes in the
WannaCry ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network. The
focus of this paper has been on using the Cosine
Similarity calculation on DeepWalk embeddings to
define a risk index that identifies what nodes, if
eliminated from the network, carry the greatest risk to
the attacker achieving their objectives, i.e. cashing out
collected ransom payments. Using the Cosine Similarity
as a risk index on an individual basis may not yield a
targeted disruption of the network objectives. However,
when the risk index was taken in combination with
community detection a more powerful analysis emerged
to isolate risky sections of the network. In particular, the
practices of graph embedding and principal component
analysis provide a truly reusable set of features for
future machine learning applications. Furthermore,
finding mechanisms to estimate the identities of nodes
on the network will help attribute nodes with a particular
Bitcoin service. However, limitations are evident with
these techniques having only used a data set relating to
the WannaCry ransomware-Bitcoin cash-out network.
One broader benefit to the research community would
be to open source multiple ransomware-Bitcoin network
data sets for validation of analysis techniques.
Significantly, the entire approach remains
predicated on identifying the ransomware seed address
to build the target network.
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